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Sammendrag
Denne oppgaven undersøker m˚anedlige pengestrømmer inn og ut av norske fond.
Datasettet best˚ar av aksje-, obligasjon- og pengemarkedsfond registrert p˚a Oslo
Børs i løpet av perioden 2006–2012. Oppgavens m˚al er a˚ identifisere sammenhen-
ger mellom disse pengestrømmene, b˚ade aggregerte pengestrømmer og individuelle
pengestrømmer for hvert fond, og en rekke forklaringsvariabler. Individuelle og in-
stitusjonelle investorer studeres b˚ade sammen og hver for seg. Resultatene tyder
p˚a at individuelle investorer er mer tilbøyelige til a˚ fokusere p˚a tidligere prestasjo-
ner enn institusjonelle investorer. I tillegg, innstrømninger til aksjefond forklares
langt lettere av relative avkastninger enn utstrømninger fra aksjefond uavhengig
av investortype. Spesifikt finner vi at innstrømninger er større for aksjefond som
har utkonkurrert andre aksjefond i fortiden. Dette forholdet er mye sterkere i opp-
gangstider og svakere for volatile aksjefond.

Abstract
This paper investigates monthly capital inflows, outflows and net flows for Norwe-
gian mutual funds. The data set contains equity, bond, and money market funds
registered at some point in the period 2006–2012 on Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE).
The goal of the study is to identify relationships between these flows, both aggre-
gated flows and flows for individual funds, and a range of explanatory variables.
Retail and institutional investor flows are studied both separately and overall. The
results indicate that retail investors, when making investment decisions, are more
likely to focus on past performance than institutional investors. Moreover, equity
inflows are more easily explained by past relative returns than equity outflows re-
gardless of investor type. Specifically, inflows are larger for equity funds that have
outperformed other equity funds in the past. This relationship is much stronger in
bull markets and weaker for volatile equity funds.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate capital flows to and from Norwegian
mutual funds. Our data consist of equity, bond, and money market funds registered,
at some point, on Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) in the period January 2006 to
December 2012. We study a set of explanatory variables potentially related to
these fund flows. This may be of general economic interest as a study of basic
investor behavior, and it may be of specific economic interest for fund managers
and other parties involved in the mutual fund industry. The main question posed
can be formulated as follows: What are the determinants of capital flows in the
Norwegian fund industry?
In answering this type of question, most papers only investigate equity funds
which often are readily available. We, however, have access to bond and money
market fund flows as well. Furthermore, a lot of research is limited to just approx-
imated net flows because raw flow data is not available. We, on the other hand,
have access to monthly inflows and outflows directly. Therefore we can investigate
flows on a deeper level than just net flows - we can isolate inflows and outflows.
Also, most papers treat investors as one homogeneous group. However, it would
be interesting to study different types of investors separately. Our data set is
divided into Norwegian retail and institutional investors. There may be significant
differences in the level of sophistication and purpose among these investors. As an
example, retail investors may be less educated, in general, compared to professional
institutional investors. This may again lead to different allocation decisions and
preferences.
Our research is is split up into two parts. Firstly, we investigate aggregated
flows for each of the fund categories – equity, bond and money market funds. That
is, we add up inflows, outflows and net flows for all funds in each category. The
method used is multiple linear regression. The flows are the independent variables
and relevant market variables are the explanatory variables.
The inspiration for this part of our study comes primarily from two sources.
Ederington and Golubeva (2011) investigate a broad set of market variables to
describe the capital flows to equity, bond and money market mutual funds in the
US. Gallefoss et al. (2011) look specifically at capital flows in the Norwegian equity
fund market. The idea is to introduce the broad perspective of Ederington and
Golubeva (2011) to the Norwegian mutual fund market while including specific
features of the Norwegian market used by Gallefoss et al. (2011).
Secondly, we investigate individual flows for equity funds. Now, individual
equity fund inflows, outflows and net flows are the dependent variables and fund-
specific variables are the explanatory variables. The method used for this part of
our research is Fixed Effects panel data regression. The inspiration comes from
several different sources. Clifford et al. (2011) isolate retail and institutional
investors and find significant differences between the two investor groups. Shu et al.
(2002) and Huang et al. (2011) utilize similar approaches and find corresponding
results. However, this is yet to be done in the Norwegian market.
To summarize, we first describe aggregated flows to and from each fund cate-
gory using market variables, before diving deeper into the equity fund market using
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individual fund flows and fund-specific variables. This will provide us with two dif-
ferent perspectives on the Norwegian mutual fund industry: The broad, overall
developments and trends in the market versus the direct competition between spe-
cific funds.
As mentioned, we utilize multiple linear regression and panel data regression.
This provides results in the form of statistically significant or non-significant co-
efficients estimates. A significant coefficient estimate implies a linear relationship
between the explanatory variable and the flow under study. A positive relation-
ship implies a tendency to move together, whereas a negative relationship implies
a tendency to move in opposite directions, all else being equal. To ensure robust
results, we use different measures of past performance and flow. The inspiration
for this approach comes primarily from Li et al. (2013) and Spiegel and Zhang
(2013). This will help to ensure that our results are not simply consequences of
misspecifications.
It is also appropriate to comment on a few limitations of this paper. Some of
these are deliberate choices whereas others are consequences of data availability
and/or quality. Firstly, this paper does not look into hybrid funds as results are
expected to be vague and camouflaged by the presence of both equity and bond
components. Investigating the three mentioned mutual fund categories being eq-
uity, bond and money market funds is considered sufficient to address the question
of interest.
Also, the available flows are, as mentioned, obtained at a monthly basis from
January 2006 to December 2012. This monthly interval therefore becomes the
observation interval for all explanatory variables as well, even if some of these have
higher observation frequencies.
The period under investigation also includes the recent financial crisis. Even
though the Norwegian economy managed quite well through this difficult period,
no one was left unmarked. This may affect the relationships and estimates found.
We also want to mention that broker fees are not included. Broker fees are more
or less constant for the vast majority of funds, and the Fixed Effects panel data
regression method controls for such time-invariant variables. Thus, the exclusion
of broker fees will not affect the remaining variables.
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2 Literature Review
Some papers with interesting perspectives on the area of study are presented below.
A lot of research finds more or less corresponding results, consequently only enough
papers are presented to cover the main findings.
Ederington and Golubeva (2011) investigate flows from a set of open-ended mutual
funds registered in the US. They use a relatively large amount of variables that have
been suggested to have predictive power about future risk and return. In addition
to actual past risk and return, these variables are used to explain observed capital
flows. Furthermore, they are not limited to equity funds, but also include bond and
money market funds. Their findings suggest that a wide range of macroeconomic
variables are related to mutual fund flows.
Gallefoss et al. (2011), investigate net flows to a set of open-ended equity mutual
funds registered on Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE). They limit their research to equity
funds with domestic investments. The paper looks at past returns, fund size,
fund fees, and other microeconomic variables to explain observed flows. They
also investigated a set of macroeconomic variables including the oil price and the
USD/NOK exchange rate - both presumably highly relevant for the Norwegian
economy. The former is found to be significant in their study, but the latter is not.
These variables are also included in our study.
Ivkovic´ and Weisbenner (2009) study capital flows to and from mutual funds in
the US. They find that inflows are driven mainly by relative performance - more
precisely, a mutual fund’s one-year performance relative to other comparable risk
funds. In other words, new money chases the best performers. Outflows, however,
are mainly driven by absolute performance. Their main reflection of interest to us
is that inflows and outflows may have significantly different drivers. Consequently
they should be studied separately, as well as unified, to achieve a more complete
description of the flows.
Ederington and Golubeva (2009) further motivates the decision to look at in-
flows and outflows separately. They do find that increased volatility is negatively
correlated with net flows, but, more interestingly, inflows as well as outflows in-
crease with increased volatility. This indicates that volatile times in general lead
to a higher total activity level. Increased returns, on the other hand, seem to affect
inflows to a much stronger degree than outflows. Summarizing this, inflows seem
to be driven by returns and risk while outflows seem to be driven mainly by risk.
The reasonable chance to make a high return may lead you into the market while
fear drives you out.
The main results of Sirri and Tufano (1998) are also related to the dispropor-
tionality between how inflows and outflows react to fund performance. They study
equity funds in America, and find that inflows are much more sensitive to past per-
formance than outflows. In other words, investors seem to flock to past winners,
but fail to flee from past losers.
Jank (2012) is one of the few recent papers that include a wide range of macroe-
conomic variables to explain the correlation between return and fund flow. The
paper concludes that macroeconomic news are highly relevant for both fund flows
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and market returns, and therefore may explain the high correlation found between
these two measures. In other words, flows and returns are both forward looking
and are a result of predicted economic activity. So, as these macroeconomic vari-
ables are correlated with future returns, they are also correlated with fund flows.
A limitation of this study is that it only utilizes data from America and it only
includes equity funds.
Kim (2010) brings an interesting view of volatility to the topic. The paper
finds that flows are less sensitive to high performance under volatile conditions.
In addition, investors mainly focus on past performance relative to competitors.
This implies that the high performance effect is a relative issue. This study uses
only equity funds, but the general idea that flow sensitivity to high returns is
very much dependent on market volatility might be valid also for bond and money
market funds. Variables reflecting the volatility level should therefore be included
in various forms.
Clifford et al. (2011) investigate recent equity fund flows and find that most
investors chase past performance to a high degree. The interesting part, however,
is that they further find that investors do this with little regard to risk - somewhat
contradictory of what Kim (2010) found. In other words, this study seems to
indicate that investors are somewhat less rational than Kim (2010) found. One
advantage of Clifford et al. (2011) is that they separate inflows and outflows as
previously discussed. They may therefore have a more precise picture of inflows
than Kim (2010). We will investigate this relationship in more detail.
Furthermore, Clifford et al. (2011) isolate retail and institutional investors.
They find that institutional investors do not chase past performance to the same
degree as retail investors. Additionally, retail investors chase idiosyncratic risk
- that is, they focus on returns and do not evaluate the underlying risk. These
findings indicate that institutional investors are somewhat more sophisticated in
their investment decisions than retail investors. Intuitively, this makes sense as
institutional investors are likely to be professional staff. Anyhow, Clifford et al.
(2011) find signs of clear behavioral bias. Behavioral differences between retail and
institutional investors are also part of our investigation.
Shu et al. (2002) investigate flows in and out of equity funds in Taiwan. They
conclude that small-amount investors have a tendency to chase past performance
and be quick to capitalize on gains. Large-amount investors, on the other hand,
are not notably affected by short-term performance. Intuitively, retail investors
are likely to be small-amount investors, and institutional investors are likely to be
large-amount investors. Under this assumption, this research would be in line with
Clifford et al. (2011).
Jank & Wedow (2012) use a sample of German registered equity funds. Their
main finding of interest is that investors have a tendency to sell both so-called win-
ners and losers. That is, funds performing very well or very poorly both experience
relatively large outflows. Presumably, funds performing very well also experience
large inflows. Additionally, funds from large fund families in general experience
both higher sales and redemption rates. Multiple explanations may justify this
observation - for example easily available information to act upon.
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Among other things, Huang et al. (2011) investigate the relationship between
flows and past returns for retail versus institutional funds in the US. That is, to
what extent fund flows react to past performance. They find that retail investors
are less concerned with idiosyncratic volatility than institutional investors. Low
volatility might imply that past returns are more likely to be repeated, whereas high
volatility makes the future much more uncertain. Following this argumentation,
fund flows should be less sensitive to returns from volatile funds. Huang et al. (2011)
conclude that institutional investors drive this dampening effect and underline the
importance of investor heterogeneity.
Li et al. (2013) is a recent study of the Chinese equity fund market. They
investigate equity fund flows through a range of fund-specific variables, very much
like we do for individual flows. They infer highly significant results for various
measures of past returns and control variables such as TNA and age. In particular,
they find that net flows are much more sensitive to returns in bull markets than bear
markets. Possibly, the uncertainty and volatility of bear markets might explain
this finding - performance persistence is less likely to occur. We bring with us
this finding, in addition to their approach to include various measures of past
performance as a robustness check. Additionally, we also investigate inflows and
outflows separately.
Finally, a note on fund flow measures is appropriate. Spiegel and Zhang (2013)
bring an interesting view on the topic of flow measures. Usually, raw flows are
not used exclusively in the studies above for two reasons. Firstly, large funds may
be expected to have larger inflows and outflows than small funds. The reason
for this may be that large funds, in general, are more well-known and easier to
gather information about. Secondly, the mutual fund industry overall has grown
rapidly the last decades. This implies that larger flows are expected now than
before. Because of this, relative flow measures are often used instead of raw flows.
Relative flows are typically raw flows divided by total net assets (TNA) of the
same fund, as in Sirri and Tufano (1998). This will to some extent correct for fund
size bias. However, Spiegel and Zhang (2013) argue that also this measure is far
from ideal. Instead they propose a measure of change in market share as being
more appropriate to infer relationships between flows and past returns. We use
their formula for change in market share as an additional measure of net flow and
include it in our study.
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3 Data
By the end of 2012, the Total Net Assets (TNA) in the Norwegian fund market
reached an all time high of 558 billion Norwegian Kroner (NOK)1. The fund market
is dominated by three main categories of funds, namely equity funds, bond funds
and money market funds.
Table 1: Breakdown of TNA in the Norwegian fund market (2012)
(a) TNA allocated among fund categories
Fund category Market share
Equity funds 49%
Bond funds 24%
Money market funds 16%
Other funds 11%
(b) TNA allocated among investors
Investor category Market share
Institutional investors 57%
Retail investors 29%
Foreign investors 13%
As seen from Table 1b, institutional investors dominate the market. This is partic-
ularly evident for bond and money market funds, whereas capital in equity funds
is more evenly divided between institutional, retail and foreign investors. Foreign
investors will not be studied separately as the number of observations is limited.
Additionally, foreign investors constitute a mix of the two main investor groups,
retail and institutional investors. Therefore results will be difficult to interpret.
However, when results are presented for investors overall, foreign investors are in-
cluded.
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Figure 1: Capital allocated in Norwegian funds by fund category
The capital allocated in Norwegian funds since the financial crisis has nearly dou-
bled, largely driven by increased investments in equity and bond funds as seen from
1According to the Norwegian Mutual Fund Association (VFF). The graph given in Figure
1 only includes funds registered on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE). Funds held by domestic
investors on other stock exchanges are therefore not included.
7
3 DATA
Figure 1. A more detailed breakdown of the Norwegian fund market with capital
flows and returns is given in Appendix B.
In the following, we present the data and sources used in our various regression
models. To analyze how different return measures affect the flow sensitivity, we
have collected daily Net Asset Values (NAV)2 and flow data for funds.
3.1 Data Sources
3.1.1 Fund returns
Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) has provided daily NAVs and dividend payments for
all funds registered on OSE at some point during the 7-year period from 2006 to
2012.
3.1.2 Fund flows
The Norwegian Fund and Asset Management Association (VFF) publishes monthly
spreadsheets of fund flow statistics. We have written a VBA macro which col-
lects the monthly observations and constructs flow time series for each fund. The
members of VFF include the majority of large-sized brokers operating in Norway.
Each broker is required to report measures such as inflows, outflows, reinvested
dividends, number of customers and total net assets differentiated between three
investor categories:
• Norwegian retail investors
• Norwegian institutional investors
• Foreign investors (Retail and institutional)
VFF also divide the funds into six different categories depending on their invest-
ments and risk exposure:
• Equity Funds
• Hybrid Funds
• Money Market Funds
• Bond Funds
• Hedge Funds/Other Funds
• Other High-Yield Funds
2The Net Asset Value is defined as the total net assets divided by the number of outstanding
shares.
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In this paper, as discussed previously, we focus on equity, bond and money market
funds. This excludes hedge funds, hybrid funds and other funds which do not
meet the criteria of the three categories. All member funds traded in the period
2006-2012 are included, and the data is thus free of survivorship bias.
For the aggregated regressions, we use the entire set of funds reported by VFF.
This includes a total of 435 equity funds, 58 money market funds and 87 bond
funds. For the panel data regressions, we introduce certain requirements due to
the longitudinal nature of our data. Specifically, there are effects of fund flows
which are “smoothened” out by aggregation, but are present at an individual level.
Three assumptions are made in section 3.4 which exclude certain observations in the
panel regression (individual flow) data set. As only equity funds have a sufficient
number of observations after introducing these requirements, we only run panel
data regression for 245 equity funds.
3.2 Variables - Aggregated Flows
To study aggregated flows we utilize multiple linear regression. As mentioned in
the introduction, the set of market variables used in this paper is inspired by two
main sources. Ederington and Golubeva (2011) utilized a wide range of variables
including aggregated returns, volatility measures like VIX and MOVE, stock mar-
ket trend, and different spreads especially relevant for the mutual fund market.
Some of these have been utilized directly in this paper, whereas others have been
modified to more closely reflect the Norwegian market. Gallefoss et al. (2011)
investigated factors likely to be relevant for the Norwegian market in particular.
Example of this are the price of Brent Crude Oil and USD/NOK exchange rate.
In addition to these variables, several potentially relevant factors are inves-
tigated. The three-month NIBOR is included to reflect the general short term
interest level in the Norwegian market. The one-month historical volatility on the
OSEAX (Oslo Stock Exchange All Share Index) is intended to more closely reflect
the domestic volatility.
All in all, we have a total of 83 monthly observations for all fund and investor
categories. This includes all months from February 2006 - December 2012 except
January 2006. Observations from January 2006 are omitted from the regression as
we do not have data for the total net assets of December 2005 needed to calculate
relative flows.
3.2.1 Dependent variables
We utilize three different flow measures to study aggregated fund flows. We include
raw flows, F . In addition, we include a fractional flow specification, Fˆ in accordance
with conventions in literature where we divide the flow to the specific investor
category by the capital of that specific investor category the previous month. This
can be interpreted as percentage growth in assets beyond return and reinvested
dividends. Spiegel and Zhang (2013) suggests that this fractional specification
is misspecified and propose change in market shares as a more robust measure
of net flows. This market share measure has no directly equivalent measure for
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inflows and outflows, and we apply the change in market share, F˜ , only for net
flows. For inflows and outflows, we divide the inflows by the total capital of all
fund categories in the specific investor category to achieve a related measure. The
various flow measures are expressed mathematically below.
C = {Retail investors, Institutional investors,All investors}
D = {Equity Funds, Money Market Funds,Bond Funds}
Dˆ = {Equity Funds, Money Market Funds,Bond Funds - active at time t}
Inflowcd,t = Aggregated inflow for fund category d for investor category c
Outflowcd,t = Aggregated outflow for fund category d for investor category c
Net flowcd,t = Aggregated net flow for fund category d for investor category c
TNAcd,t = Total Net Assets of fund category d for investor category c
Aggregated flows are reported in 106 NOK and TNA are reported in 103NOK. All
investors is the sum of retail, institutional and foreign investors.
Table 2: Dependent variables used for aggregated flows
F cd,t Fˆ
c
d,t F˜
c
d,t
Description Raw Flow Frac. flow ∆ Market share
Inflow Inflowcd,t
Inflowcd,t
TNAcd,t−1
Inflowcd,t∑
d∈D
TNAcd,t−1
Outflow Outflowcd,t
Outflowcd,t
TNAcd,t−1
Outflowcd,t∑
d∈D
TNAcd,t−1
Net flow Net flowcd,t
Net flowcd,t
TNAcd,t−1
TNAcd,t∑
d∈D
TNAcd,t
− TNA
c
d,t−1∑
d∈Dˆ
TNAcd,t−1
3.2.2 Independent Variables
Returns
Dividend-adjusted returns on individual funds are calculated from NAVs at the
beginning and end of specified time periods. The returns reported here are one-
year returns. Equally weighted average returns for each fund category are then
calculated on the basis of these returns. All funds registered at some point in the
period 2006–2012 are included.
Return on Equity Funds: r¯eqt
Equally weighted average return of equity funds over the interval [t− 11, t].
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Return on Money Market Funds: r¯mot
Equally weighted average return of money market funds over the interval
[t− 11, t].
Return on Bond Funds: r¯bot
Equally weighted average return of bond funds over the interval [t− 11, t].
Volatility measures
Volatility on OSEAX: σoset
The volatility on the OSEAX is calculated as a one-month volatility. The OS-
EAX consists of all shares registered on the exchange. This measure may give
a domestic and precise estimate of stock market volatility in the Norwegian
market.
Percentage change in historical volatility on OSEAX: %∆σoset
The percentage change in historical volatility from month t−1 to t. Changes
in volatility may be even more relevant than the general volatility level as
investors are likely to react to changes in market conditions.
Other variables
NIBOR: nibt
The 3-month NIBOR, the Norwegian Interbank Offered Rate, is intended to
reflect the general interest level for unsecured money market lending which
should be particularly relevant for bond and money market funds.
Oil Price: roilt
The oil price (Brent Crude) is a natural measure of the state of the Norwegian
economy. It affects the Norwegian business environment to a very high degree
and is therefore included as a possible explanatory variable.
Exchange Rate: rext
The exchange rate relates to purchasing power in Norwegian market and may
therefore be relevant for investment decisions.
Volatility measures and other variables are originally gathered from EcoWin Reuters
and then adapted to meet our specific needs.
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3.3 Variables - Individual Equity Flows
In the panel data regressions, we only use fund-specific variables. We introduce
two different measures of excess return. One is a simple excess return, calculated
as ri − r¯i which is just the return of the fund subtracted by the average return of
all stock funds registered on OSE over the interval [t− 11, t].
We also find a risk-adjusted excess return for each fund, αi,t, by applying the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) with daily return observations over the inter-
val [t− 11, t]. When this return measure is used, funds are separated into subcate-
gories with a proper benchmark specified for each subcategory. These benchmarks
are listed in Appendix A.
3.3.1 Dependent variables
Three flow measures corresponding to the ones used for aggregated flows are used.
We apply a raw flow measure, F , a fractional flow specification Fˆ , and a measure
equivalent to change in market share for net flows F˜ . Individual raw flows are
reported in 103 NOK. Mathematical formulations are given below.
C = {Retail investors, Institutional investors,All investors}
I = {Set of equity funds}
Iˆ = {Set of equity funds active at time t}
Inflowci,t = Inflow for fund i for investor category c
Outflowci,t = Outflow for fund i for investor category c
Net flowci,t = Net flow for fund i for investor category c
TNAi,t = Total net assets of fund i for investor category c
Table 3: Dependent variables used for individual equity flows
F ci,t Fˆ
c
i,t F˜
c
i,t
Description Raw Flow Frac. flow ∆ Market share
Inflow Inflowci,t
Inflowci,t
TNAci,t−1
Inflowci,t∑
i∈I
TNAci,t−1
Outflow Outflowci,t
Outflowci,t
TNAci,t−1
Outflowci,t∑
i∈I
TNAci,t−1
Net flow Net flowci,t
Net flowci,t
TNAci,t−1
TNAci,t∑
i∈I
TNAci,t
− TNA
c
i,t−1∑
i∈Iˆ
TNAci,t−1
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3.3.2 Independent variables
One year historical excess return of fund: rˆi,t
Excess return of the fund, either αi,t or ri,t− r¯i,t, over the interval [t− 11, t].
This measure of past performance is included to explain why investors choose
one equity fund over another.
Excess return multiplied by idiosyncratic risk: rˆi,tσ[i,t]
The idiosyncratic volatility, calculated from the residuals of CAPM over the
interval [t − 11, t], is multiplied by the excess return measure to investigate
how the flow sensitivity to past returns is affected by fund-specific risk. The
risk level of a fund may affect how investors perceive past performance.
Excess return multiplied by market indicator: rˆi,tindi,t
The market indicator variable, ind, takes a value of 1 if OSEFX (Oslo Stock
Exchange Mutual Fund Index) has a positive return over the interval [t−11, t],
and zero otherwise. As the idiosyncratic volatility, it is multiplied by the
excess return measure. This approach will decompose the excess return and
tell us if flows react differently to returns depending on the state of the general
stock fund market.
Control variables
Age: log (agei,t)
This is the logarithm of the age of the fund measured in months at time t.
Capital of fund: log (TNAci,t)
This is the logarithm of the TNA of the fund at time t for investor category
c.
Number of customers for fund: log (cust.ci,t)
This is the logarithm of the number of customers of the fund at time t for
investor category c.
13
3 DATA
3.4 Data Requirements for Individual Equity Flows
In this section we introduce three requirements for individual equity flows.
Requirement 1.
Number of monthly flow observations ≥ 12 (1)
Requirement 2.
Average number of institutional customers ≥ 20
Average number of retail customers ≥ 100
Average number of total customers ≥ 20
(2)
The rationale behind these assumptions is that small funds with few customers
usually operate with high fees which results in very dispersed flows with many
monthly observations of zero flow. In an attempt to capture funds which are openly
traded, we introduce a minimum requirement to the average number of customers
of the specific investor category of the fund. Note that the requirements given in
(2) are set separately for each investor category. A fund which does not satisfy the
requirement of institutional investors, could still be included in the retail investor
category if it satisfies the requirements of number of retail investors. An illustration
of our approach is given in Figure 2 below.
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400
600
800Fund: SKAGEN Kon- Tiki
Average number of ins. investors: 2280
Min. purchase: 1.000 NOK
[1
0
6
]
N
O
K
Figure 2: Comparison between the inflow from institutional investors to the funds
KLP AksjeEuropa Indeks and Skagen Kon-Tiki. With the requirement of a mini-
mum number of average institutional customers, the first fund is excluded.
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Requirement 3.
The capital of liquidated funds are not included as outflows from funds. The
liquidation of a fund is often a decision made by the management, and not its
investors. The liquidation of a fund’s assets is therefore not considered an outflow
of the type we want to describe.
With these data requirements, the initial sample of 550 funds is reduced to:
Table 4: Sample statistics: Individual equity flows
Investor Category Retail Institutional Total
Number of observations 11619 10304 14404
Number of funds 181 148 231
15
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4 Methodology
Mutual fund flows are commonly investigated on an aggregated level. The advan-
tage of aggregated data is that it is relatively straight forward to analyze. Ag-
gregation smoothens out the noise which is often observed at an individual level.
However, this also ignores individual differences caused by fund-specific charac-
teristics such as relative performance and idiosyncratic volatility. Additionally,
aggregation involves a substantial decrease in the number of observations, which
makes statistical inference more difficult.
Some recent papers study mutual fund flows on fund-level, including Spiegel and
Zhang (2013), Huang et al. (2011) and Li et al. (2013). As opposed to aggregated
fund flows which are usually investigated by multiple linear regression, these papers
utilize panel data regression to incorporate the longitudinal nature of the data.
Throughout our paper two different methods are used to establish relationships
between sets of explanatory variables and fund flows for retail, institutional and
overall investors. Multiple linear regression is the preferred method for aggregated
equity, bond and money market flows. However, Fixed Effects panel data regression
is used for individual equity flows as it is a more powerful and robust method than
standard linear regression when cross-sectional data is available.
4.1 Multiple Linear Regression
Multiple linear regression will form the basic methodology for the first part of this
paper where we analyze flows on an aggregated level for each of the three fund
categories. The standard model is presented below.
Yt = β1Xt,1 + β2Xt,2 + . . .+ βpXt,p + ut (3)
The basic assumptions are those of independent and identically distributed
error terms in time and space normally distributed with mean zero and constant
variance, ut ∼ N (0, σ2). These errors are approximated by the observed residuals.
Additionally, one must assume that linear relationships are present and that
data is gathered as a random sample, the latter meaning no bias of any kind in the
observations (Walpole et al., 2006). All assumptions underlying linear regression
are checked and evaluated when used.
Hypothesis tests on the explanatory variable coefficients are done utilizing the
software package Stata. The null hypothesis for all variables is that of no significant
relationship, βi = 0. The p-value and t-statistics are presented in the results
and indicate whether or not the null hypothesis is kept or rejected at the given
significance level (Walpole et al., 2006). A low p-value implies that there is a small
probability of observing a value as extreme as the one in the sample given that
the null hypothesis is true. In other words, a small p-value implies that the null
hypothesis more likely is false.
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4.1.1 Descriptive Statistics
A correlation matrix of aggregated net flows and explanatory variables is presented
in Appendix C. This matrix is used to ease the interpretation and discussion of the
observed coefficient results. Furthermore, some descriptive statistics of the various
aggregated flows, past returns, and TNA are also given in appendix . These plots
and graphs are included to provide intuition for the data set and identify underlying
trends and patterns of general interest for the reader. Reference is made to these
descriptive statistics where appropriate.
Another reason why it is important to study such correlation matrices, is related
to the concept of multicollinearity. This is the presence of two or more highly cor-
related variables. This is a concern as such explanatory variables tend to describe
the same variability. This does not necessarily lead to very different estimates of
the regression coefficients, but it will typically lead to larger standard errors. This
may again make it harder to prove significance in the multi-collinear variables.
Included separately the regression coefficients may be significantly different from
zero, but jointly included they might not (Walpole et al., 2006).
4.1.2 Model for aggregated flows
Our specific multiple linear regression model for aggregated flows is given below.
Aggregated Regression Model
F cd,t =β0 + β1r¯
eq
t−1 + β2r¯
bo
t−1 + β3r¯
mm
t−1 + β4σ
ose
t−1 + β5∆%σ
ose
t−1 + . . .
β6nibt−1 + β7roilt−1 + β8r
exc.
t−1
The choice of variables is discussed previously in this paper. In addition, two
dummy variables are also included to adjust the flows for events not related to
market wide features (these are not shown above). Simple removal of data points
would lead to the exclusion of other data points in the same time period. The inclu-
sion of dummy variables at relevant time points is therefore preferred. In our case,
we include dummy variables to adjust for changes in fund category classifications
by VFF, one of our main data providers.
4.2 Panel Data Regression
Panel data will form the basic methodology for the second part of this paper to
accommodate hypothesis testing on individual variables in the best possible way.
We only investigate individual equity flows as our requirements greatly reduce the
amount of available data for bond and money market funds.
Panel data are repeated observations on the same cross-section, typically of
individuals or firms in microeconomic applications, observed for several time pe-
riods (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). By allowing for cross-sectional variation, the
precision of estimation is increased. The increased precision comes at the expense
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of unobserved heterogeneity. On an individual level, it is necessary to control for
endogeneity among explanatory variables.
The simplest model for studying panel data, is the pooled ordinary least squares
(OLS) model given by:
yit = α+ xitβ + uit, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, t = 1, 2, . . . , T (4)
By pooling observations across cross-section i and time t, a dataset spanning NT
observations is obtained. OLS will give consistent estimators α and β, under the
assumption that the regressors are uncorrelated with the error term. The com-
monly applied OLS covariance matrix will however be biased as one would expect
correlation over time t for a given individual i. (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) When
the NT observations are dependent, this leads to overestimation in the precision
of the estimators. Applying OLS in a panel setting requires the use of standard
errors which are corrected for the longitudinal nature of the data.
When the explanatory variables are assumed to be uncorrelated with the error
term, the pooled OLS estimator introduced in (4) with panel-corrected standard
errors is appropriate for panel data models. The explanatory variables are said
to be exogenous if this is the case. Similarly, a variable is said to be endogenous
if it is correlated with the error. Endogeneity typically arises from omitted vari-
ables, measurement errors and/or sample selection. The most prevalent cause of
endogeneity in econometrics is omitted variables (Wooldridge, 2002). Incautiously
applying OLS under such conditions result in biased and inconsistent estimators,
often referred to as omitted variable bias.
Former studies have shown that fund specific characteristics such as size and
age have a significant effect on fund flows (Dahlquist et al., 2000). These are fairly
intuitive and observable measures. However, studies also show that factors such
as fund manager skills affect flows on an individual level (Kumar et al., 2011).
The skill and stock-picking ability of the fund manager is more difficult to observe,
than size and age. Such unobservable effects are likely to introduce an omitted
variable bias. A distinct advantage of panel data models is the ability to control
for unobserved effects which are time-invariant.
We adopt the notion of Wooldridge (2002) and introduce the basic unobserved
effects model for panel data:
yit = xitβ + ci + ui,t, t = 1, 2, . . . , T (5)
In (5), ci is the individual effect which is often referred to as unobserved hetero-
geneity. The individual effect ci is treated as a random variable on par with xit
and yit. Consistent estimation of β requires some assumptions with regard to the
unobserved heterogeneity. Specifically, the choice of model depends on whether ci
is correlated with the observed explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2002).
4.2.1 Fixed Effects Model
The prevalent choice of model in econometrics is the Fixed Effects (FE) model. The
FE model treats ci as a random, unobserved variable which is potentially correlated
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with the explanatory variables (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). FE is more robust
than the Random Effects (RE) model which assumes zero correlation between ci
and xit. The advantage of the FE model is the ability to control for unobserved
heterogeneity which is time-invariant. Thus, we can disregard variables as long as
they are assumed to be constant over time. This means that excluding variables
such as fund manager skills, broker reputation, fee structure and advertising and
marketing expenses will not distort our remaining variable results.
The unobserved effect is eliminated by time-demeaning (5) over t = 1, 2, . . . , N
periods:
y¯i = x¯iβ + ci + u¯i (6)
Subtracting Subtracting (6) from (5) gives:
y¨i = x¨iβ + u¨i (7)
In this model, y¨i = yi − y¯i, x¨i = xi − x¯i, and u¨i = ui − u¯i. As seen from (7),
the unobserved heterogeneity ci is eliminated. The parameters can now be esti-
mated consistently by applying pooled OLS. This transformation is known as the
within-transformation and the obtained estimator is the within-estimator βFE . To
ensure that this estimator is well behaved asymptotically and efficient, additional
assumptions are required as outlined by the following definition:
Definition 1. The Fixed Effects (FE) within estimator for the population model
yit = xitβ + ci + uit is given by:
βFE =
(
N∑
i=1
N∑
t=1
x¨′itx¨it
)−1( N∑
i=1
N∑
t=1
x¨′ity¨it
)
(8)
The estimator βFE is consistent and unbiased under the following assumptions
(Wooldridge, 2002).
E (uit|xit, ci) = 0 (9)
rank
T∑
i=1
E(x¨′itx¨it) = K (10)
E(uiu′i|xi, ci) = σ2uIT (11)
Although the within transformation effectively eliminates the unobserved hetero-
geneity, it also eliminates any time-invariant variable effects as discussed previously.
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4.2.2 Robust Standard Errors
If autocorrelation or heteroskedasticity effects are present, the usual variance ma-
trix estimators from pooled OLS are biased. This does not affect the validity of
estimators, but it does yield inconsistent standard errors. For valid statistical infer-
ence, one should control for these factors. In such cases, it is common to calculate
the robust variance matrix estimator of βFE as Wooldridge (2002):
Avarˆ(βFE) = (X¨
′X¨)−1
(
N∑
i=1
X¨uˆiuˆiX¨i
)
(X¨ ′X¨)−1 (12)
Estimators that assume no serial correlation are severely biased when this assump-
tion is invalid. The robust standard estimator is in general consistent, and is usually
preferred for longer time-series (Kezdi, 2005). We therefore use robust standard
errors when estimating the panel data regression coefficients.
4.2.3 Models for individual equity flows
Our specific panel data regression models for individual equity flows are given
below. For these flows we conduct two different regressions.
Panel Data Model A
F ci,t =β0,i + β1rˆi,t−1 + β2 log(agei,t−1) + β3 log(TNA
c
i,t−1) + . . .
β4 log(cust.
c
i,t−1)
Originally, we only include excess return, in addition to control variables, to see
how this variable affects flows.
The excess return of a fund is denoted rˆi, calculated either as the α from CAPM
or simply as a fund’s excess return over an equally weighted average of all equity
funds. This return measure is calculated over the 12-month period from t− 12 to
t− 1.
Panel Data Model B
F ci,t =β0,i + β1rˆi,t−1 + β2rˆi,t−1σ[i] + β3rˆi,t−1indt−1 + . . .
β4 log(agei,t−1) + β5 log(TNAci,t−1) + β6 log(cust.
c
i,t−1)
In the second model, we also include idiosyncratic (fund-specific) volatility and a
market indicator. The idiosyncratic volatility is calculated from the residuals of
CAPM above as in Fama and MacBeth (1973). The market indicator will tell us
the condition of the market, bull or bear, over the last year. It takes the value
21
4 METHODOLOGY
1 if the mutual fund index (OSEFX) has a positive return over the historical 12
months period, and 0 otherwise:
indt =
{
1, if rmarket[t−11,t] > 0
0, if rmarket[t−11,t] < 0
The idiosyncratic volatility and market indicator are not included by themselves,
but are instead each multiplied by the excess return measure. The results will then
tell us how these two variables affect the flow-performance relationship found in
model A. The total effect of excess returns on fund flows can then be rewritten in
the following way:
In a good market, model B gives the following flow-performance relationship:
F ci,t = ((β1 + β3) + β2σ[i]) rˆi,t−1 + control variables (13)
And similarly, in a bad market (indi,t−1 = 0) the flow-performance relationship is
reduced to:
F ci,t = (β1 + β2σ[i]) rˆi,t−1 + control variables (14)
We also include dummy variables for each monthly time step in accordance with
Wooldridge (2002).
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5 Results & Discussion
5.1 Aggregated Flows
In this section, results for aggregated flows for equity, bond and money market
funds are presented and discussed - that is, inflows, outflows and net flows are
added up for all funds in each category and analyzed.
Also, only the raw flow measure will be included in the tables found here. Full
results are available in Appendix D.1. There, as mentioned previously in this paper,
we also include flows relative to size and a measure of change in market share. This
will help ensure that our results are indeed robust and this will be commented on
where appropriate.
The multiple linear regression model for these flows is restated below. For a
complete discussion of the model and variables used, see methodology section 4.1.2
and data section 3.2.
Aggregated Regression Model
F cd,t =β0 + β1r¯
eq
t−1 + β2r¯
bo
t−1 + β3r¯
mm
t−1 + β4σ
ose
t−1 + β5∆%σ
ose
t−1 + . . .
β6nibt−1 + β7roilt−1 + β8r
exc.
t−1
Coefficients for dummy variables are omitted in the tabulated results presented in
this section.
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5 RESULTS & DISCUSSION
5.1.1 Aggregated equity flows
A specific finding from our aggregated regression model is that retail investors in
equity funds have a tendency to sell when equity funds as a category are doing
well. This can be seen from the positive coefficient for past equity fund returns
and outflows in the table to the left. In other words, retail investors seem eager
to capitalize on previous gains. Also, retail investors in unsuccessful equity fund
markets might be reluctant to sell their shares as they do not want to accept loss
even though it might be the rational thing to do. This effect is not apparent for
institutional customers and is camouflaged for investors overall. Moreover, this
result is confirmed by our other two flow measures found in the appendix. This
also emphasizes the need to sometimes distinguish between investor types as they
may have significantly different drivers.
Indeed, Jank (2012) find that German equity fund investors have a tendency to
sell both so-called winners and losers. We find a tendency to sell a winning fund
category. Shu et al. (2002) find that small-amount investors have a tendency to
redeem high performing funds, whereas large-amount investors a more likely to keep
these funds and sell the losers. If one assumes that small-amount investors typically
are retail investors and large-amount investors typically are institutional investors,
then this can be somewhat related to our results. Retail investors capitalize on
previous gains, whereas institutional investors have a larger time-horizon on their
investments. Ivkovic´ and Weisbenner (2009) also find that outflows are driven by
absolute performance. This is in line with the strong relationship inferred here
between equity outflows and average past returns of equity funds registered on
OSE.
Inflows also have a positive and significant coefficient for retail investors. This
suggests that retail investors also are more likely to buy equity funds when equity
funds as a category are doing well. This is a quite intuitive result, but it is not
found significant for our other two flow measures in the appendix.
Finally, the three-month NIBOR is positively related to equity outflows and con-
sequently negatively related to net flows for all investor categories. This result is
consistent across the other flow measures as well. This might suggest capital flows
to bond and money market funds, at the expense of equity flows, as the three-
month NIBOR has a positive effect on bond and money-market flows. However,
this is only a hypothesis and it is not tested for scientifically.
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5 RESULTS & DISCUSSION
5.1.2 Aggregated bond flows
Bond returns are negatively related to bond outflows for retail investors. This ten-
dency is supported by the full results in the appendix. This makes sense if investors
expect high past returns to imply high future returns. Keeping bond fund positions
will then lead to further increase in value.
Also, the three-month NIBOR is negatively related to bond outflows for insti-
tutional investors and overall. A high NIBOR may imply high future returns for
bond funds. It then makes sense to keep bond fund shares.
Furthermore, money market returns are negatively related to bond inflows for all
investors. This might indicate some sort of competition between bond and money
market funds. Money market returns are also negatively related to bond outflows
for the raw flow measure. However, this effect is weaker than the effect on inflows,
and it is also not present for our other two flow measures in the appendix.
The volatility on OSEAX is also negatively related to bond inflows for insti-
tutional investors and overall. This might suggest that investors are reluctant to
invest in bond funds in volatile times. However, this result is not significant for
our other two flow measures, even though the same tendency is present there.
Finally, the three-month NIBOR, oil price and exchange rate (USD/NOK) seem
more significant for institutional investors. One hypothesis is that institutional
investors are likely to use a wider set of market variables for investment purposes.
At the very least, they consider more angles and options having, in general, much
larger investment portfolios and professional experience and education. Indeed, the
findings of Clifford et al. (2011) indicate greater investment sophistication among
institutional investors - that is, investments in accordance with established theory.
Huang et al. (2011) also find that institutional investors look beyond past returns
to a greater degree than retail investors.
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5 RESULTS & DISCUSSION
5.1.3 Aggregated money market flows
Money market returns are clearly positively related to money market inflows for
retail investors and overall. This is confirmed by the full results in the appendix.
In fact, this is also the case for institutional investors for the two relative flow
measures found there. High past returns may be tempting for new investors, for
example traditional bank deposit savers. Ederington and Golubeva (2011) find
a positive relation between recent money market returns and net money market
flows. We do find a similar trend for net flows for investors overall.
A very interesting finding concerns the change in stock market volatility. The
percentage change in stock market volatility is positively related to money market
outflows for retail investors and overall. The tendency in net flows is consequently
a negative relationship with the change in market volatility. This tendency is in
fact apparent for all investor types. A hypothesis for this may be that investors
flee the market because of fear. The slightly higher expected returns for money
market funds as opposed to bank deposit may no longer outweigh the increased
risk. Ederington and Golubeva (2011) find that the percentage change in the VIX
is positively related to net money market flows. This is in sharp contrast with our
findings above. We find a clear tendency of retail investors fleeing money market
funds when the stock market volatility increases.
Additionally, the NIBOR is positively related to money market outflows for
institutional investors and overall, but also positively related to money market in-
flows. However, the outflow effect is both larger and more consistently confirmed
by the full results in the appendix. Reallocations between bond and money market
funds might explain the somewhat counter-intuitive observation that outflows from
money market funds increase with the three-month NIBOR.
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5.2 Individual Equity Flows
In this section, results for individual equity flows are presented and discussed - that
is, equity flows are treated at an individual fund level with some requirements for
the amount of customers and continuous observations.
As for aggregated flows, only the raw flow measure will be included in the tables
found here. Full results are given in Appendix D.2. There we also include flows
relative to size and a measure of change in market share more or less corresponding
to the flow measures for the aggregated flows. This will help ensure that our results
are indeed robust and will be commented on where appropriate.
The two panel data regression models for these flows are restated below. For a
complete description and discussion of the models and variables used, see method-
ology section 4.2.3 and data section 3.3.1.
Panel Data Model A
F ci,t =β0,i + β1rˆi,t−1 + β2 log(agei,t−1) + β3 log(TNA
c
i,t−1) + . . .
β4 log(cust.
c
i,t−1)
Panel Data Model B
F ci,t =β0,i + β1rˆi,t−1 + β2rˆi,t−1σ[i,t] + β3rˆi,t−1indt−1 + . . .
β4 log(agei,t−1) + β5 log(TNAci,t−1) + β6 log(cust.
c
i,t−1)
Model A only includes a simple excess return measure by itself, in addition to
the control variables, whereas model B decomposes the plain excess return effect
on flows to include idiosyncratic volatility and effects related to market condition.
The market indicator takes the value 1 if the stock market has gone up in the past
twelve months, and 0 otherwise. Therefore, the flow-performance relationship from
model B in bull markets become (indi,t−1 = 1):
F ci,t = ((β1 + β3) + β2σ[i,t]) rˆi,t−1 + control variables (15)
And similarly, in bear markets (indi,t−1 = 0) the flow-performance relationship is
reduced to:
F ci,t = (β1 + β2σ[i,t]) rˆi,t−1 + control variables (16)
Coefficients for control variables and time dummy variables are omitted in the
tabulated results. For convenience, we do not report time, t, and investor category,
c, subscripts for the variables presented in the remainder of this section.
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Equity Inflow
Institutional Retail Total
(A)
rˆi 13012.5
∗∗ 10716.1∗∗ 31666.6∗∗
(2.96) (2.76) (2.91)
(B)
rˆi 13539.3 10871.5 3454.1
∗
(1.88) (1.86) (2.29)
rˆiσ[i] -1201.3
∗∗∗ -561.1∗∗∗ -2277.9∗∗∗
(-6.26) (-3.78) (-5.31)
rˆiind 39190.9
∗∗ 18056.2∗ 75900.2∗∗
(3.11) (2.40) (2.69)
Equity Outflow
Institutional Retail Total
(A)
rˆi -3880.2 -251.4 -2032.6
(-0.67) (-0.06) (-0.25)
(B)
rˆi -2563.5 4430.8 18541.6
(-0.16) (0.53) (1.04)
rˆiσ[i] -86.17 -478.9
∗∗ -1208.4
(-0.16) (-2.98) (-1.88)
rˆiind 429.6 7037.2 1118.5
(0.05) (0.80) (0.05)
Equity Net flow
Institutional Retail Total
(A)
rˆi 16892.7
∗ 10967.5∗∗ 33699.2∗∗
(2.41) (2.56) (2.76)
(B)
rˆi 16102.6 6440.7 11912.5
(0.94) (0.75) (0.71)
rˆiσ[i] -1115.1
∗ -82.15 -1069.5∗
(-2.03) (-0.48) (1.14)
rˆiind 38761.3
∗∗∗ 11019.0 74781.7∗∗∗
(3.36) (1.35) (1.72)
Table 8: Coefficients of return variables in the Fixed Effects regression. These tables
are reported only for one measure of flow, raw flow F , and one measure of excess return,
αcapm. Control variables and time dummies are suppressed. The full regression results
with control variables and all flow measures are reported in appendix D.2.
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5.2.1 Individual equity flows
Firstly, we find that equity fund inflows are positively related to past relative returns.
This can be seen from model A on the left, and this result is clearly consistent
independent of the flow and excess return measure used. This can be verified by
looking at the full results in the appendix.
In general, we find that equity fund inflows are more easily explained by past
relative performance than outflows. One hypothesis is that if you have money to
invest, it is logical to assume a rational evaluation of where to put them. Past re-
turns are simple and intuitive measures to distinguish between options. However,
withdrawal of money may be caused by reasons not directly related to fund perfor-
mance. If you need the money, for whatever reason, you take them out. However,
when investing money you may evaluate different investment options carefully.
Another interesting finding concerns the idiosyncratic risk of the equity funds
included in regression B. We find that past relative performance is less important
for flows to volatile equity funds. This can be seen from the negative coefficients
in the table to the left which reduce the total effect of excess returns. Intuitively,
this might be because past returns are less likely to be reproduced. There is less
reason to assume performance persistence among these funds as they are relatively
volatile. Consequently past returns do not seem like a relevant indication of fu-
ture performance anymore. This tendency is confirmed in the appendix for equity
inflows for all investors, but is also present for equity outflows for retail investors.
Indeed, Huang et al. (2011) find evidence in support of our results. They show
that the flow-performance sensitivity is weaker for funds with high idiosyncratic
risk. Moreover, this dampening effect is stronger for more sophisticated investors.
In fact, we also document this. The negative coefficients found in relation to
idiosyncratic risk and equity fund inflows are consistently larger for institutional
investors than retail investors. This might indicate that institutional investors
account for fund-specific risk to a larger degree than retail investors when buying
equity funds as this tendency is also present for some of the relative flow measures.
Furthermore, equity fund inflows are found to be much more sensitive to past
relative performance in bull markets, as seen from regression B. A possible hypoth-
esis for this is closely related to our findings above. That is, in a declining market
past returns may be of less importance as volatility and uncertainty thrive - the
past is less likely to be descriptive of the future. In a rising, stable (bull) market
the economic situation is arguably more predictable. Consequently, investors might
turn to past performance to compare investment opportunities. This result is also
clear in the complete results in the appendix.
Kim (2010) finds that when markets are highly volatile, which is generally the
case in bear markets, relative returns are less relevant for flows. This is in agreement
with our findings. Li et al. (2013) find that past performance is positively related to
net equity fund flows, but, more interestingly, they find that this effect is stronger
during bull markets than bear markets. This is also in accordance with our results.
Also, as for the idiosyncratic volatility effect, it seems like this bull market
effect is especially strong for institutional investors. The overall effect of simple
excess returns on inflows is quite similar for retail and institutional investors, as
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seen from model A, but the coefficients found for idiosyncratic volatility and the
market indicator in model B are much larger in absolute value for institutional
investors than retail investors. However, this finding is not obvious for all flow and
excess return measures in the full results.
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6 CONCLUSION
6 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to describe capital flows to and from Norwegian
mutual funds. In the introduction the following question was posed: What are the
determinants of capital flows in the Norwegian fund industry? The main findings
of our research are given below.
Our first finding is that institutional investors are likely to use a wider set of
market variables to evaluate investment opportunities. Retail investors are more
likely to concentrate on past returns within the relevant fund category. This finding
is supported by several studies. Clifford et al. (2011) find that retail investors are
more sensitive to past performance than institutional investors. Huang et al. (2011)
further find that institutional investors look beyond past returns to a greater degree
than retail investors.
Another finding is that retail investors in equity funds are more likely to sell
their shares when equity funds as a category have performed well. They might be
eager to capitalize on previous gains. At the same time, both retail and institutional
investors target specific equity funds that have outperformed competitors in the past
when buying funds. Indeed, Ivkovic´ and Weisbenner (2009) find that while outflows
are driven by absolute performance, inflows are driven by relative performance.
This is in line with the results above where equity fund outflows are driven by
market performance, whereas equity fund inflows are explained by the relative
performance of specific funds.
Having established that individual equity fund inflows are sensitive to past rel-
ative returns, we further find that this relationship is stronger in bull markets.
Intuitively, past returns and the idea of performance persistence make more sense
in a stable, non-volatile environment. Indeed, both Kim (2010) and Li et al. (2013)
support our findings. Specifically, the latter paper finds that past performance is
positively related to net equity fund flows, and that this effect is stronger in bull
markets than bear markets.
Furthermore, we find that flows to volatile equity funds are less affected by past
returns. Huang et al. (2011) support this result. Moreover, they find this effect
to be larger for institutional investors which our results also indicate for inflows to
equity funds. Once again, being able to reproduce past performance may be less
likely for more volatile funds, explaining the reduced focus on past returns.
Additionally, we find indications that bond and money market funds compete for
the same capital. Indeed, Ederington and Golubeva (2011) document reallocations
between these two fund categories depending on past returns. As they are relatively
similar in nature, this result seems quite intuitive. Also, we find that an increase
in stock market volatility drives retail investors out of money market funds.
As a final comment, bond and money market flows are not investigated individ-
ually, but only aggregated for each category because of data limitations. However,
it would be highly interesting to analyze these flows on an individual fund level as
we have done for equity funds.
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A Benchmarks
Table 9: Benchmarks used for the various categories of equity mutual funds.
Equity Funds # of funds Benchmark
Norwegian Funds 66 OB Fund Index (OSEFX) (NOK)
Global Funds 80 MSCI World ($)
European Funds 36 MSCI Europe ($)
Nordic Funds 29 MSCI Nordic ($)
North American Funds 20 MSCI USA ($)
Asia Excluding Japan 11 MSCI Asia Pac. Excl. Japan ($)
Emerging Markets Fund 11 MSCI Emerging Markets ($)
Japanese Funds 10 MSCI Japan ($)
Eastern European Funds 8 MSCI EM Eastern Europe ($)
Chinese Funds 5 MSCI China ($)
Swedish Funds 3 MSCI Sweden ($)
Latin America Funds 1 MSCI EM Latin America ($)
Indian Funds 1 MSCI India ($)
Sector Funds - Finance 3 MSCI ACWI Financials ($)
Sector Funds - Health Care 11 MSCI ACWI Health Care ($)
Sector Funds - Technology 12 MSCI ACWI IT ($)
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B Norwegian Fund Market Structure
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Figure 3: Total capital allocated in Norwegian funds.
40
B.1 Norwegian Equity Funds
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Figure 4: Statistics for Norwegian equity funds
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Figure 5: Statistics for Norwegian bond funds
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D Results
D.1 Results - Aggregated Flows
In the following pages, we present the full results of multiple linear regression
on aggregated flows. The sample includes monthly flow data on equity, bond and
money market funds registered on Oslo Stock Exchange at some point in the period
2006–2012.
Two dummy variables have been included to account for changes in the clas-
sification of investor categories by VFF. These dummy variables are not reported
in the results. Also, for convenience we do not report investor category, c, and
fund category, d, subscripts for the independent variables presented in this section.
The following variable list explains the notation used. For further description of
variables, we refer to section 3.2.
Variable Description
Dependent variables:
Ft Raw flow in 10
6 NOK
Fˆt Relative flow measure 1 (See sec. 3.2.1)
F˜t Relative flow measure 2 (See sec. 3.2.1)
Independent variables:
r¯eqt−1 Equally-weighted average return on Equity Funds on interval [t −
12, t− 1]
r¯bot−1 Equally-weighted average return on Bond Funds on interval [t−12, t−
1]
r¯mot−1 Equally-weighted average return on MM Funds on interval [t−12, t−
1]
σoset−1 One-month historical volatility on OSE in month t− 1
%∆σoset−1 Percentage change in historical volatility on OSE from t− 2 to t− 1
nibt−1 3-month Norwegian Inter Bank Offered Rate (NIBOR)
roilt−1 Return on Brent Crude Oil over month t− 1
rexc.t−1 Return on exchange rate (USD/NOK) over month t− 1
constant Intercept in regression model
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D.2 Results - Individual Equity Flows
In the following pages, we present the full results of Fixed Effects panel data regres-
sion with time dummies. The sample includes monthly flow data on equity funds
listed on Oslo Stock Exchange in the period 2006 –2012. We present the results
using two different models, model A and model B. Model A only includes excess
return, rˆi, and the control variables age, capital and number of customers. Model
B includes the full set of variables. That is, including a decomposition of excess
return.
As a robustness check, we run the regression using three different flow measures,
F , Fˆ and F˜ , as well as two different measures for the excess return rˆi: αCAPMi
and ri − r¯i. Monthly time dummies are included, but omitted from the reported
regression results. For convenience, we do not report time, t, and investor category,
c, subscripts for the variables presented in this section. The following variable list
explains the notation used. For further description of variables, we refer to section
3.3.
Variable Description
Dependent variables:
Fi Raw flow in 10
6 NOK
Fˆi Relative flow measure 1 (See sec. 3.3.1)
F˜i Relative flow measure 2 (See sec. 3.3.1)
Independent variables:
rˆi
(αCAPMi)
This is the risk-adjusted excess return of the fund over its bench-
mark. We apply the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) with
daily returns over a 1-year historical period.
rˆi
(ri − r¯i)
This is a simple measure of excess return. We subtract the his-
torical yearly return of the fund by the average return of all stock
funds listed on Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE).
rˆiσ[i] This is the excess return multiplied by the idiosyncratic volatility
of the fund. The idiosyncratic volatility is calculated over a 1-year
historical period.
rˆiind This is the excess return multiplied by a market indicator. The
market indicator is a binary variable, taking the value 1 if there
has been a positive return on OSEFX, and 0 otherwise.
log(agei) Age of the fund measured in months.
log(TNAi) Capital for the specific investor category of the fund.
log(cust.i) Number of customers for the specific investor category of the fund.
constant This is the average intercept across all funds.
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